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5. Responding to Economic 
Globalisation: Strengthening 
and Centralising State Capacity 
Professor Ian Marsh 
Governance in Australia was transformed after 1983. In the face of a perceived economic 
crisis and weakened state capacity, major changes were progressively introduced which 
were designed to buttress governmental authority and rework the role of the state (e.g. 
Kelly, 1992; Pusey, 1991). The most fundamental change concerned the ends and means 
that framed conceptions of the state. A new narrative concerning the policy challenges 
presented by an open and globalised economic context was adopted by both major parties. 
In a decade, developmental and social policy frameworks that had been in place since 
Federation were overturned. Bipartisan endorsement was critical in the rapid 
implementation of this agenda.  
The first administrative/organisational step involved a reframing of governmental 
structures, which was intended both to enhance central control and to extend the role of 
unfettered markets or quasi-market disciplines. Their influence was expanded through 
private and public sectors (Keating, 2004; Bell and Hindmoor, 2009; for a similar 
discussion in the British context, Gamble, 1988; for some of the unintended outcomes, 
Braithwaite, 2008).  
This approach was adopted by both major parties as a remedy to the stagflation of the 
1970s. Overly protected markets, overly rigid wage fixing, a sclerotic trade union 
movement, government services framed around the interests of producers not consumers 
and capture of programmes by rent seeking interests were held to be its principle cause 
(e.g. Australia at the Cross Roads). Change in public policy continues to unfold within 
this broad framework. This is evident in the ends adopted for - and the means used to 
achieve - outcomes in three key policy domains: the economy, the provision of public 
services and the welfare system. Whether these approaches are appropriate for managing 
the complex and distinctive issues that arise in remote Australia is the central concern of 
this report. 
These changes were introduced through three broad phases: the first covered economic 
activities that were directly under Commonwealth control; later change was extended to 
areas like public utilities where state cooperation was required; then, from the late 1990s 
until the present, attention switched to social policy and human services. Micro-economic 
reform has provided the narrative thread. Through newly enhanced top-down authority, 
market or quasi market arrangements have been extended across the whole public sector, 
including to the delivery of public services. One of the claimed benefits was cost 
efficiencies. By recasting citizens as consumers, another claimed benefit was client 
empowerment. We will see later that, in the case of remote Australia at least, outcomes 
have been almost wholly problematic.  
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The following paragraphs explore in turn these three dimensions of change: 
Strengthening the Central State: Centralised policy control was enhanced by 
budgetary, organisational and personnel changes that were designed to give the centre the 
language, technologies and administrative capacity to drive wider changes. As a first step, 
the control of ministers and key co-ordinating departments was strengthened. Within this 
framework, the focus has shifted progressively from economic structures and regulatory 
frameworks to, most recently, the delivery of human services. In addition, a strategic 
agency, the Productivity Commission, was repositioned and it has emerged as a principal 
steward of the forward agenda.  
The move to stronger controls by ministers and coordinating departments occurred 
progressively. In 1983, the incoming Labour government inherited a report on public 
administration (Reid, 1983), which echoed a recurrent theme: how to increase the 
responsiveness of the public service to the elected government. In implementing this 
report, the authority and accountability of ministers, particularly senior ministers, was 
extended and the influence of the central departments (Treasury, Finance, Prime Minister 
and Cabinet) widened and consolidated. A number of budgetary and organisational steps 
reinforced these organisational changes. 
The first development involved budgetary arrangements (Howard, 1986). Central agency 
control was reinforced through the Financial Management Improvement Program (FMIP).  
To better cost programs, forward estimates were introduced and to better focus on 
performance, budgets were recast in terms of programs and outcomes. Reporting against 
these indicators was also introduced. These changes all served to enhance the influence of 
the Finance and Treasury Departments. The influence of Treasury was further 
strengthened because, in the formation of the strategic agenda, the narrative of economic 
liberalisation caste this department in the critical role (e.g. Edwards, 1996).  
In 1983 the government published a White Paper on the machinery of government (this 
and the subsequent developments are reviewed in detail in Nethercote, 1986). This 
foreshadowed a strengthened role for central agencies, a Senior Executive Service, and 
augmented resource allocation processes. These changes were embodied in a Public 
Service Act in 1984. One key step involved a new accountability structure for top 
executives. Permanent Heads were re-caste as departmental secretaries, serving at the 
pleasure of their ministers and with the concurrence of the prime minister. In future, 
these officers were to be appointed by ministers with the approval of the prime minister 
and after consultation with the chair of the (then) Public Service Board. A Senior 
Executive Service was also established with officers appointed on fixed term contracts. 
Again the focus on ministers was reinforced as promotion was at the discretion of 
departmental secretaries without the involvement of the Public Service Board, a step 
which was reinforced by its later abolition and its replacement by an advisory agency, the 
Public Sector Management Commission. In other words, the notion of a unified career 
service was considerably qualified and the influence of ministerial views and desires given 
significantly more weight in personnel appointments and decisions. This had substantial 
longer term implications for the orientations and loyalties of public managers. Based on 
notional productivity gains, across-the-board efficiency dividends were also introduced.  
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Another key structural step was taken in 1987, when inter-related policy functions were 
brought together in mega departments (Social Security, Employment and Workplace 
Relations etc) with senior and junior ministers dividing responsibilities for overall 
strategy and priorities and specific programs. This step created powerful departmental 
‘silos’ at the peak of the national policy making system. 
In addition, the adoption of budgeting via Portfolio Budget Statements required 
departments to undertake strategic and business planning. Moreover, a number of 
specialised regulatory functions were progressively spun off into separate agencies (e.g. 
ACCC; ASIC; Centrelink, Air Services Australia etc). For example in 2002, Centrelink had 
partnerships with 25 federal and state agencies, serviced 6.4 million customers from over 
1000 service points and disbursed annually around $55 billion or roughly one third of the 
Commonwealth budget (Halligan, 2008). 
Finally, what is now the Productivity Commission increasingly assumed a much more 
prominent role in the development of the forward agenda. This agency became its primary 
source. The subsequent pattern of agenda change can be traced though it’s annual reports 
– from tariff reductions to privatisation, on to competition policy and contracting out, 
and turning progressively to more troubled areas at the heart of federal-state relations: 
health, transport, education as well as welfare and indigenous issues. The Commission 
also has important monitoring responsibilities. For example, the Commission prepares a 
biannual report on progress in indigenous development. Reflecting the implicit policy 
framework, this report focuses predominantly on individual circumstances and job-ready 
capacities. The most recent report fills some 750 pages (further discussed on page 99) 
A liberalised economy: From roughly 1907 until 1983, the central government played 
a critical role in the development of industry and employment. This occurred via two 
mechanisms. First, industry development was largely based on tariffs. This created a 
substantial manufacturing sector, but one largely oriented to the domestic market. 
Second, public enterprises were a major source of employment. These included a major 
bank, two airlines, a shipping service, railways, transport, electricity generators and 
distributors etc.  
From the late 1980s through to the mid 1990s, Commonwealth and State governments 
progressively withdrew from most of these activities. In the new neo-liberal narrative, 
public utilities were seen as cumbersome monopolies, retarded in their efficiency and 
responsiveness by the absence of bracing market pressures. Newly liberalised capital 
markets were assumed to be sufficiently mature and flexible to make the primary 
allocation decisions. We will see later that, in the case of remote Australia, this latter 
premise at least lacked realism.  
In its rhetoric and in practice, the state also progressively withdrew from employment 
creation. In general, such programs were deemed to be ineffective and counter-productive 
(Saunders, 2004). Interventions now focused on training and skills development and 
(explored further below) mutual obligation. We will see later how this has affected the 
CDEP scheme. Meantime, from the late 1980s, micro-economic reform was introduced to 
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strengthen the supply side of the economy (Keating, 2004). Its impacts on public sector 
services are reviewed below. 
Contracting out public services: The turn to contracts with NGOs or for-profit 
organisations for the delivery of public services was driven by both theoretical and 
practical considerations. At a theoretical level, the development of public choice, 
principal-agent and other approaches produced a new array of perspectives on the relative 
efficiency of public versus private provision. For example, this literature offered new 
perspectives on the likely capture of programmes by organised interests (such as business 
groups, public sector unions etc) and the aggrandising tendencies of public bureaucracies 
(Olson, 1965; Brittan, 1975; Downs, 1957; Niskanen, 1971). Principal-agent theory 
suggested more extensive use of contracts to avoid the shirking, opportunism and self-
serving practices that were asserted to be endemic in ordinary hierarchical or professional 
relationships (e.g. Miller, 2005; for a critique, see Sabel, 2004).  
These theoretical findings informed the development of public policy. Following a review 
of national competition policy in 1993 (Hilmer, 1993), the principle of competitive 
neutrality was extended to the provision of public services. In a first tentative application, 
the government white paper, Working Nation (1994) proposed the competitive delivery of 
case management into the then Commonwealth Employment Service. This experiment was 
deemed a success and in 1998, the whole service was privatised. The resulting Job 
Network represented one of the first comprehensive attempts internationally to apply 
market principles to the provision of assistance to disadvantaged job seekers (Considine, 
2001).  The relevant department (DEEWR) has now established contracts with around 109 
non-governmental organisations (including for-profit and not-for-profit suppliers) to 
provide employment related services from around 1000 sites (Productivity Commission, 
January, 2010).  
A Productivity Commission report in 2002 (The Job Network) noted the potential for 
more difficult clients to be sidelined. It also noted the very considerable savings which 
had accrued to the Commonwealth Budget, a point echoed more critically in the later 
Freud Report on employment services in the UK (2006). The use of contract 
arrangements has since extended to disability employment and a range of special services. 
As we will see in the next section, these are primary means for service delivery in remote 
Australia. In addition, to prevent error and to overcome inappropriate practices, 
accountability requirements have progressively become more elaborate. A 2007 report by 
the Catholic Social Services Australia (CSSA, 2007) found that under the pressure of 
accountability requirements, transaction costs had mushroomed disproportionately in the 
mainstream employment sector and that incentive arrangements had made creaming and 
parking endemic (also Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-for-Profit 
Sector, 2010 esp. 297-348). Contracting out to for-profit and NGO service providers is 
now the dominant approach. For example, in 2002 the Department of Family and 
Community Services (FaCSIA) spent $730 million on partnership arrangements of various 
kinds with 15 000 non government organisations. In a comprehensive survey of published 
evaluations, Hodge (2004) finds that, beyond very specific circumstances, the cost savings 
claimed for outsourcing have not been demonstrated. 
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Contracting out through NGOs can also affect their representational capacities (e.g. 
Sawer, 2002). Moreover, since there is typically no revokable purchase decision, the 
notion that quasi-market relationships enhance the power of citizens qua consumers 
seems mostly to be a fiction. This is particularly the case with outsourced programmes in 
remote Australia, where the non-existence of a network of potential service providers 
effectively undercuts the economic rationale for outsourced arrangements’ (Dillon and 
Westbury. p. 59- 60). 
An unpublished appendix to the Productivity Commission Review of the Not-for-profit 
Sector (Appendix J, 2010, available on line) lists NGO concerns about the working of the 
contractual system. The most fundamental involved the capacity of organisations to plan 
for local needs. The following comments are cited as representative of NGO concerns: 
Sector Connect Inc: ‘The major issue arising with respect to local knowledge and needs 
was a perceived limitation on organisations’ ability to plan for changing local 
needs…..They had little or no real input into shaping future funding programs to reflect 
what they were experiencing and learning locally’ (Appendix J, 2010 p. J2) 
Illawarra Forum Inc: ‘The purchase of service contracting…erodes the independence of 
NFPs in ways that make it difficult for them to remain responsive and flexible to 
community needs…A better model …..based on identification of local needs, the 
negotiation of funding levels and performance targets and measures is required’ 
(Appendix J, 2010 p. J4) 
Catholic Social Services Australia: ‘Over time there is a tendency for contracts and 
funding requirements to become more detailed and prescriptive…If this trend continues 
there is a risk of a shrinking gene pool of ideas and service techniques in Australian social 
services. The cost of tighter government control and more detailed, more uniform 
reporting mechanisms will be a reduction in local autonomy and a decreased ability to 
harness local knowledge’. 
Other matters that attracted criticism from agencies included: the short term nature of 
government contracts; the inappropriate transfer of risk; excessive compliance and 
reporting costs; the degree to which contracts are being used to micro-manage NFPs; and 
the sheer volume of contracts that community organisations need to manage. Examples of 
these individual concerns are explored in detail in the PC document. 
Mutual responsibility in the welfare system: Australia’s social policy system encompasses 
the provision of health, housing, education and community development as well as 
benefits to individuals. Whilst activity in all these areas has been affected by contracting 
out, the following discussion concentrates on changes to the income support system. This 
was originally conceived as a residual arrangement (Castles, 1985). Income support was 
based not on social insurance but rather transfers from general tax revenues. The system 
was designed to assist people in particular need, for example the indigent aged or 
disabled citizens or those, like the unemployed, with transient needs. The protected 
domestic economy meant that, at least in principle, jobs were readily available. Providing 
foreign exchange receipts from agriculture and minerals were sufficient, tariffs could be 
used to sustain employment in manufacturing. Moreover, the regulated wage fixing 
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system fulfilled a social justice function since the basic wage was based on need and not 
on capacity to pay. In practice of course, full employment was often not realised – for 
example, unemployment was particularly acute during the depression.  
In the immediate post war period the broad reach of income support and social security 
measures was significantly extended and deepened (e.g. health arrangements, 
pharmaceutical benefits, housing, educational access, pensions etc) and this general 
framework, which was progressively augmented,  prevailed broadly until 1983. Meantime, 
technical change, the movement of women into paid employment and changing 
occupational patterns created new imperatives – for example, for more flexible payment 
and work arrangements and for more part time jobs. Structural adjustment from the mid 
1980s also produced a surge in unemployment levels.  
The welfare system was the primary buffer against these accumulating pressures. 
However, by 2001, 28% of all Australian residents 15 and over were receiving income 
support (Keating, p. 137). Moreover, in 2007, of the 550 000 people on unemployment 
benefit (UB), 325 000 had been in receipt of benefits for more than 12 months – hardly 
the bridging assistance that Deakin had envisaged. In 2005-06, 700 000 were in receipt 
of disability pensions and 600 000 supporting parents benefits (Chenoweth, 2008). A 
system largely intended to deal with transitional events had become the principal source 
of support for a significant proportion of the population.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, governments responded by much tighter targeting and cost 
cutting. Later mutual obligation came into increasing prominence. In 1988, then 
Opposition Leader Howard had foreshadowed a ‘Community Service Scheme’ for 
unemployment recipients. Work for the dole legislation was not however enacted until 
1997. From 1998 the principal of mutual obligation was introduced in conjunction with 
development of the contract-based Job Network. Those unemployed for twelve months or 
those assessed as having significant difficulties in qualifying for employment receive 
Intensive Support Customised Assistance. These clients are assigned a case manager who 
determines training and developmental needs. Failure to comply results in a ‘breach’ 
report and serial breaching results in disqualification from benefits. Assessment of needs 
for assistance and referrals to Job Network agencies are provided by Centrelink. From 
2006, these principles were progressively extended to citizens in receipt of disability 
benefits and to single parents.  
Commonwealth-State relations: The overlap in responsibilities between Australia’s 
federal and state governments had long been a feature of the Federation. But the broader 
economic agenda outlined above, progressively required new capacities for cooperation 
between levels of government. This intensified as microeconomic reform was extended to 
education, health, utilities and transport. An initial agenda was established through the 
Hilmer review. The organisational framework for its implementation was put in place 
with the establishment of COAG in 1992. The micro-economic reform agenda has since 
expanded to embrace the activities of state governments and the COAG apparatus has 
become progressively more elaborated. Currently, over 40 ministerial councils operate 
under its general auspices including one covering indigenous affairs, but not remote 
Australia. Specific developments in indigenous affairs are considered later. 
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‘Wicked problems’ and whole-of government approaches: The election of the Howard 
government in 1996 coincided with a turn in the agenda from more narrowly economic 
issues towards human services. As noted above, the first steps involved action in areas in 
which the Commonwealth government had direct responsibility, notably establishment of 
the Job Network. However the inadequacy of siloed approaches became increasingly 
apparent, particularly in contexts such as long term unemployment, burgeoning numbers 
of disability pensioners and single mothers, governmental concerns for alcohol and drug 
abuse etc. Hence, attention shifted to the systemic contexts in which such ‘wicked 
problems’ were embedded. Responding to similar pressures, the Blair government in the 
UK had, from its election in 1997, placed considerable emphasis on whole-of-government 
working (PMSU: Wiring it Up; Joining it Up, HMSO, both 1998).  
This approach began its migration to Australia with the establishment of the Management 
Advisory Committee (MAC) in 1999. This was a committee composed of the heads of each 
federal department with a brief to take the lead in cross-service issues. This process 
advanced in 2002 with the establishment of COAG trials (reviewed below, p. ). Indeed, the 
delivery of services to remote communities became the seed bed for testing the efficacy of 
whole-of-government arrangements. This was further advanced in 2003, when Peter 
Shergold was appointed head of the Prime Ministers department. In 2004, MAC published 
a comprehensive report Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to 
Australia’s Priority Challenges, which explored the requirements for joined-up 
government including culture, organisational arrangements, funding, reporting structures 
etc. This was follow by two other complementary documents: Tackling Wicked Problems 
(APSC, 2007) and Policy Implementation through Devolved Government (APSC, 2009). 
These explored the complexities of such arrangements, the requirements to make them 
work and the lessons from early experience, for which Indigenous affairs was a prime site. 
These are reviewed in more detail in a subsequent section. 
Conclusion: Looking back from the present vantage point, two outcomes are clear. First, 
government continued to play a leading part in a wide variety of economic and social 
policy areas. Government may have changed its role, but its influence was no less 
pervasive. The state determines what outcomes it wants to achieve and how they will be 
sought. Second, there is a clear template for action: in the first instance, strong central 
leadership with prime responsibility for determining desired outcomes located in the 
central authorities; thereafter, public services are best delivered through contracts or 
quasi-contractual arrangements with specialist for-profit agencies or NGOs.  
This framework was modified to accommodate two cases: those which involve chronic or 
intractable problems; and those which engage more than one department or level of 
government and/or local stakeholders. In these settings, management was shifted to a 
whole-of-government pattern. Before considering how effective this proved in practice, 
changes to the administration of Indigenous policy are traced. 
  
